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This paper evaluates complementarities of labor market institu-
tions and the business cycle in the context of a stochastic dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model economy. Matching between workers and va-
cancies with endogenous time spent in search, Nash{bargained wages,
payroll taxation, and di®erential support for unemployed labor in
search and leisure are central aspects of the model. For plausible
regions of the policy and institutional parameter space, the model ex-
hibits more persistence than standard RBC models and can exhibit
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indeterminacy of rational expectations paths without increasing re-
turns in production. Furthermore, labor market institutions act in a
complementary fashion in generating these e®ects.
1 Introduction
The high level of unemployment in Europe remains a di±cult subject for
economists. The number of candidate explanations seems to have risen
faster in recent years than the phenomenon itself. Since the publication
of the 1994 O.E.C.D. Job Report, it is received wisdom that government
policies and more generally "institutions" have played a central role in the
European unemployment problem. Here one includes unemployment insur-
ance, collective bargaining mechanisms, social assistance, job protection and
other labor market regulation, labor and capital taxation, and product mar-
ket regulation. A central di±culty remains, however, that these institutions
have been around since the late 1960s, when unemployment in Europe was
strikingly low: why are things so di®erent now compared to then? For this
reason, more promising approaches have stressed interactions of institutions
with exogenous events, or have invoked models with increasing returns to
scale and multiple equilibria.1 Recent empirical work by Blanchard (1999)
and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) attributes a large component of variance
in unemployment to interactions of institutions with shocks such as the oil
price increases of the 1970s and the slowdown in total factor productivity.
The theoretical underpinning for these interactions is lacking, however.
In related theoretical papers, Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and
Snower (1998) have stressed labor market institutions in a®ecting unemploy-
ment. An important conclusion of this research is that modest reforms in
isolation may have little impact, as long as other institutions remain un-
changed. As these analyses are static, the dynamics of such complementari-
ties and their interactions with the rest of the macroeconomy { including the
business cycle { are not well-understood. Itt is seldom noted that rises in Eu-
ropean unemployment have generally occurred at business cycle frequencies,
making it a cyclical as well as a structural phenomenon. In any case it would
appear imperative to model unemployment as the outcome of an equilibrium
1For examples see Blanchard and Summers (1987), and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
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process, given that the largest increases occurred at least two decades ago.
More recently, Prescott (1999) has echoed the view that labor market insti-
tutions and the "rules of the game" may be essential to explaining highly
persistent phenomena like the Great Depression in the United States, the
current bust in Japan or high unemployment in Europe.
Our paper investigates potential complementarities of labor market insti-
tutions in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We
base the investigation on the expectation that the functioning of the labor
market { as clearinghouse for the most important factor of production { will
a®ect business cycle dynamics. Our paper takes this issue seriously by giving
up assumptions that labor markets are perfectly competitive or can costlessly
replicate the social optimum, as in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). We
study a number of institutions which are suspected of in°uencing the steady
state and the dynamics of economies, including the generosity of unemploy-
ment insurance, the subsidy of non-search unemployment (social welfare or
unconditional unemployment assistance), the e±ciency of job matching, la-
bor taxation, and wage bargaining. In particular, we explicitly distinguish
between unemployment insurance { a subsidy to job search { and social assis-
tance, which is a subsidy to leisure (time spent noch working and not search-
ing). In doing so, we stress the di±culty of distinguishing between those who
search and those who do not. One key ¯nding is that this "misclassi¯cation
rate" of leisure as search unemployment - or in another interpretation the rate
of moral hazard - plays a central role in determining the dynamic properties
of the model (namely the possibility of endogenous cycles). In addition, we
study the role of bargaining power of workers and capital in wage determina-
tion, deviating from competitive remuneration. Finally, we study the model
under both constant returns in production conditions usually employed in
real business cycle (RBC) analysis as well as under increasing returns, to
determine whether complementarities are operative between these aspects.
It is already known that taxation can induce multiple equilibria in static
(for examples, see Blanchard and Summers, 1987 or Burda, 1994) and in-
determinacy in dynamic (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 1997) settings. By con-
sidering labor taxation, we explicitly allow for this interaction as well, in
particular its e®ect on endogenous search intensity by in°uencing the net
(after tax) gain to work. Our model allows us to analyze explicitly the con-
sequences of labor market reform as has been already done in the context of
the Mortensen-Pissarides model (Millard and Mortensen, 1997, or Mortensen
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and Pissarides, 1996).
Intimately related to this issue is the nature of unemployment. As Lucas
(1977, 1978, 1980), Pissarides (1990) and others have argued, the distinction
between "voluntary" and "involuntary" unemployment is ill-de¯ned if not
vacuous. The old notion of involuntary unemployment as a state in which
workers are ready to work at some going wage (Keynes) does not do justice
to the nature of the phenomenon. There are both involuntary and voluntary
aspects of all unemployment. This paper is agnostic as to the actual un-
employment we observe, endorsing a concept of equilibrium unemployment
which relies on matching frictions and search, but at the same time recognizes
that the vast majority of unemployed do not choose this state.2
The central results of the paper can be summarized as follows. We ¯nd
that important regions of the parameter space in this general equilibrium
model are associated with both high output persistence as well as indetermi-
nate dynamics or sunspot equilibria. In particular, a higher "misclassi¯cation
rate", or the fraction of leisure which is compensated as search unemploy-
ment, is associated with indeterminacy3. At the same time, model indeter-
minacy can be generated by higher replacement ratios, holding the misclas-
si¯cation rate constant. Our ¯ndings of complementarity extend also to the
division of match surplus in the economy. Further, we show that allowing
the presence of modest increasing returns in production makes indeterminacy
more likely and improves the match of the model's times series to those of
actual economies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the main fea-
tures of our dynamic general equilibrium model are described. In particular,
the maximization problem of representative households and ¯rms are used
to derive aggregate demand and supply relationships and market clearing
conditions for general equilibrium. In the third section, we study the equilib-
rium dynamics of the model economy, in particular the possibility of sunspot
equilibria. This is followed by an analysis of the stochastic properties of the
model's variables, which we compare to those of contemporary time series of
the German economy. Section 5 discusses some results on marginal versus
global e®ects of altering labor market institutions, and extends the comple-
2The variable unemployment is absent from most work in the RBC literature, which
generally assumes clearing labor markets.
3For examples of this indeterminacy literature, see Benhabib and Farmer (1994),
Farmer (1993), and Weder (2000).
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mentarity of labor market institutions highlighted by Coe and Snower (1997)
to a dynamic setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model is based on a standard representative agent growth model of a
closed economy. The household sector owns all inputs and rents its services
to the ¯rms. Firms produce a homogeneous ¯nal good which is then sold
to households to be consumed or invested as physical capital. There is un-
certainty in the model, especially as regards the instantaneous employment
of labor resources; following the literature, we assume the existence of com-
plete contingent markets, so that agents can insure themselves against this
idiosyncratic risk.4
2.1 Preferences
The economy consists of a large number of identical households of measure
one.5 Every household has access to a complete set of frictionless asset mar-





¯tU(ct; lt) ¯ 2 (0; 1): (1)
¯ stands for the subjective discount rate. E0 denotes the expectations oper-
ator conditional on time 0 information. Instantaneous utility is specialized
to the functional form
U (ct; lt) = log ct +
A
1 + Â
l1+Ât A > 0; Â  0: (2)
4It should be stressed that this is a standard simpli¯cation and should not be interpreted
as a trivialization of unemployment. Indeed, imperfect information and moral hazard
aspects of unemployment are likely to lead to co-insurance. Thus, even if the unemployed
were indi®erent in equilibrium, resource costs of providing that insurance is motivation
alone for treating unemployment as a serious economic problem.
5Small (large) letters indicate individual (aggregate) variables. Since households are
identical in equilibrium, we omit the identifying index.
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The time endowment can be divided between leisure, employment lt, and
time engaged in search activity, st:
lt + lt + st = 1
The explicit modeling of time spent neither in work nor in leisure (i.e. non-
market activities) is a novel aspect in the dynamic general equilibrium liter-
ature with search. Most existing models simply de¯ne search unemployment
as the complement to time spent working, and capture the costliness of search
in terms of lost output.6 Employment evolves according to
lt+1 = (1¡ ±L)lt + ftst ±L 2 (0; 1]: (3)
where ft is the job ¯nding rate per unit time expended in search, and ±L
represents an exogenous wastage of employment matches. In this model
on-the-job search is ruled out. Capital is accumulated by the households
according to
kt+1 = (1¡ ±K)kt + it ±K 2 (0; 1]: (4)
where kt and it are the capital stock and investment expenditure respectively.
Physical capital depreciates by ±K per period.
2.2 Firms and Technology
In the ¯nal goods sector, output is supplied by a ¯xed large number of com-
petitive ¯rms. Each operates under technology that constant returns to scale










with ® 2 (0; 1); µ ¸ 0; (5)
where ki;t; li;t are the ¯rm's i input in capital and labor. Kt; and Lt are
aggregate inputs in capital and labor. µ denotes externalities that can im-
ply increasing returns. Total factor productivity Z evolves as a stationary
stochastic process
logZt+1 = (1¡ ½z) logZ + ½z logZt + zt+1 Z ´ 1; ½z 2 [0; 1):
zt+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance ¾2z . In choosing its optimal
employment level, each ¯rm has to take into account current aggregate states
6See for example Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995).
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and that it may take time to ¯ll vacancies. Firms can post vacancies vi;t at
cost a: Each ¯rm chooses sequences of capital services to hire, and how much
to invest in ¯nding new workers by posting vacancies. In addition, the ¯rm's
decision implicitly re°ects the aggregate savings decisions of households, since
the interest rate will depend on the availability of loanable funds for ¯rms's
investments.
2.3 Labor Market Institutions
2.3.1 Matching and Search in the Labor Market
A hallmark of the model we study is that it explicitly incorporates several
important deviations of labor markets from the Walrasian paradigm. In a
model of equilibrium unemployment, search and trade frictions preclude im-
mediate wedding of production factors. Incremental changes in labor supply
and the level of employment cannot take place instantaneously but require
time and resources to match advertised vacancies by ¯rms and search e®ort
by agents. As a reaction to trade frictions, households must use part of their
time endowment for labor market search activities. Similarly, ¯rms post va-
cancies to signal workers their willingness to hire; these vacancies and the
search activity of ¯rms has resource costs which are either explicit (in the
form of job placement agencies) or implicit (the opportunity cost for the ¯rm
engaged in search). Aggregate employment Lt+1; evolves according to
Lt+1 = (1¡ ±L)Lt +Mt ±L 2 [0; 1] (6)
where ±L is an exogenous separation probability, Mt is the measure of job
matches which occur in period t. The timing indicates a time-to-match lag.





t % 2 (0; 1):
Denote by Vt are the announced vacancies and St is the time spent by house-
holds in search. This functional form derives its popularity from Blanchard
and Diamond (1989) who report a reasonable ¯t with U.S. labor market
data. There is a technical problem which has been noted by Den Haan,








´% £ > 0; %  1: (7)
The constant £ is a scaling factor. Every agent and ¯rm is de¯ned to be
small in relation to the economy so that actions do not a®ect aggregates and
take matching rates as given. The rate that a given searching individual
agent is matched with a vacant job during the unit interval { appearing in





For constant f , the mean duration of a completed unemployment spell is





with mean steady-state vacancy duration given by 1=q. As the respective
transition rates depend on the aggregate number of the two types of traders,
the matching process generates trading externalities.
Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and Den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000) also examine the role of search in dynamic general equilibrium model.
The current paper di®ers from these because it explicitly admits the existence
of relevant labor market institutions and abandons the assumptions that per-
fect competition obtains everywhere and that °uctuations are caused only by
shocks to the economy's fundamentals (as a rule, total factor productivity).
We will discuss these aspects in what follows.
2.3.2 Payroll Taxes, Unemployment Insurance and Social Assis-
tance
Our model economy possesses a simple government sector which collects taxes
and redistributes them to currently unemployed agents. Let ¿t be the payroll
tax rate on labor income at time t. We assume that the government runs a
7Speci¯cally, the Cobb-Douglas form does not guarantee matching probabilities be-
tween zero and one. In contrast, it is easy to verify that (7) satis¯es the usual functional
properties of a matching function while generating plausible matching probabilities.
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balanced budget, so the government must set the tax rate period by period
to satisfy the constraint
¿twtLt = bSt + "b(1¡ St ¡ Lt) = (1¡ ")bSt + b"(1¡ Lt) (10)
where wt is the wage rate and b is a transfer payment per unemployed agent
who is engaged in search. Unemployed agents not engaged in search enjoy a
transfer equal to "b with " 2 [0; 1]. " has the interpretation of a misclassi¯-
cation error of leisure as search. If " = 1 then leisure and search are treated
symmetrically; if " = 0 there is no subsidy of leisure. The balanced bud-
get restriction renders the tax rate ¿ endogenous, while the unemployment
insurance bene¯t b and " are constant policy parameters.
It should be stressed that unemployment in the model has two forms:
Time not spent working but spent in search for a new job, and leisure
(time withheld from market activities). The government compensates both
forms of unemployment in di®erent ways. First, an unemployment insurance
scheme compensates search time S at constant fraction of the steady-state
net wage, b. Second, non-search, non-market activity is also subsidized by
the state: the parameter " thus captures the generosity of the social safety
net. In particular, it helps to determine the gains from job search in un-
employment, and admits the possibility of a "poverty trap" in which agents
are indi®erent between work and the dole. A value of " close to 1 reduces
the net gains to search by increasing the value of leisure or other nonmarket
activities relative to search. Ceteris paribus, a high value of " also increases
the countercyclicality of taxes, since in times of low employment transfers
increase and must be ¯nanced.
2.3.3 Wage Determination and Bargaining Strength
In this section we model the wage bargaining process, which represents the
second deviation from a standard labor market. Matches give rise to surplus
which can be shared arbitrarily between paired agents and ¯rms, so that the
wage will generally deviate from marginal productivity remuneration charac-
teristic of the neoclassical model. Wages in the present model are determined
at the match level as a Nash bargaining solution where the constant » can be
interpreted as the bargaining strength of the ¯rms. In particular, the wages
9
















Implicitly, the fallback position for labor excludes any subsidy to search in
case of failure to reach an agreement; this could be interpreted as an institu-
tional arrangement which penalizes refusal to accept job o®ers after a match
occurs. The wage then obeys















where » 2 [0; 1]. According to (11), the net wage rate is a weighted average
of the marginal product of labor net of advertising costs per number of un-
employed agent and the disutility that arises from work corrected for forgone
search costs. The expression A(1¡St¡Lt)
Â
¸t
+ "b is the minimum compensation
that workers require to work. In the extreme case » ! 1, the ¯rm collects the
entire surplus and the wage rate reaches its allowable minimum. This wage
rule is similar in spirit to Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), who show that
for a particular value of », this rule is equivalent to the optimal rule chosen
by a social planner and the market solution and can be considered an optimal
contract. This correspondence is only possible, however, in economies with a
one-to-one relationship between the market outcomes and social (planner's)
optima since no compelling reason is given why this should be the case. We
think of deviations from the optimum as "labor market imperfections" which
give excessive power either to labor or to management. Under a bargaining
setup, it is easy to obtain suboptimal equilibria since the marginal product
of labor is distorted away from its social opportunity cost, and agents do




The household maximizes lifetime utility (1) by choosing a sequence of con-
sumption, labor and physical capital subject to the constraints (3), (4) and
the period-by-period resource restriction
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ct + it = (1¡ ¿t)wtlt + bst + rtkt + "b(1¡ st ¡ lt) (12)
where wt and rt are respectively the wage and the capital rental rate. We
follow the standard procedure and assume that workers pool their incomes
(and implicitly their unemployment) and make their policy decisions in a
manner of a representative agent whose decisions are denoted by lower case
letters.8 Economic pro¯ts in this economy are zero.
Denote the aggregate state of the economy by -t ´ fKt; Lt; Ztg : The
value function À : <2+ £ - ! <+ for the representative agent's dynamic
programming problem satis¯es the functional equation
À(kt; lt; -t) = max
ct;st;lt+1;kt+1
U(ct; lt) + ¯EtÀ(kt+1; lt+1; -t+1) (13)
subject to (3), (4) (12) and given the aggregate laws of motion for -t. As-
suming the di®erentiability of the value function, the ¯rst order conditions




¸t = ¯Et¸t+1 [rt+1 + 1¡ ±] (15)
¹tft = A(1¡ st ¡ lt)Â ¡ (1¡ ")¸tb (16)
¹t = ¯Et [¸t+1[(1¡ ¿t+1)wt+1 ¡ "b]¡ A(1¡ st+1 ¡ lt+1)Â + (1¡ ±L)¹t+1]
(17)
where ¸t, and ¹t denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the cap-
ital (physical wealth) and employment constraints. The ¯rst two equations
(14) and (15) describe the optimal savings sequence. Equations (16) and (17)
characterize the household's optimal search and labor supply policies. They
imply that the household equalizes the marginal disutility of searching today
to its expected payo®, which is given by the wage payments (in terms of
consumption units) and minus disutility from working and plus the expected
value of foregone search costs.
8See, for example, Danthine and Donaldson (1995). To date, no easily implementable
algorithm is available allowing the modeller to track easily individual wealth pro¯les,
unemployment durations, and other state variables; our procedure masks potential e®ects
created by agent heterogeneity. Alternatively, one may think of each household being a
family which receives income from having a fraction lt of its members at work.
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2.4.2 Firms
The problem of the representative ¯rm can be de¯ned as choosing values of
vacancies, capital, and future employment such to maximize the expected
sum of discounted pro¯ts, taking the path of wages, interest rates, and in-
tertemporal marginal rates of substitution as given. The households' optimal
behavior implies an asset pricing kernel { the price at time t of a certain claim




which is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption. It
is assumed that ½t+1 is the discount factor employed by ¯rms and is taken
by them as given.9
De¯ne the ¯rm's value function W : <+ £ - ! <+. Assuming that W
is unique, it can be characterized as the solution to the functional equation
W (lt; -t) = max
vi;t;ki;t+1;li;t+1
xi;t¡wtli;t¡rtki;t¡avi;t+Et½t+1W (lt+1; -t+1) (18)
subject to the production function and the ¯rm transition equation for em-
ployment
li;t+1 = (1¡ ±L)li;t + qtvi;t: (19)
Pro¯t maximization requires for each ¯rm to set its capital, employment,

















(20) indicates that ¯rm hires capital up to the equality of the rental rate and
the marginal product of capital. It is also optimal for the ¯rm to advertise
vacancies such that the marginal cost of posting an opening (per unit proba-
bility of ¯lling the vacancy) is equal to expected pro¯ts plus the ¯rm's costs
of foregone search, conditional on that the job is ¯lled (21).
9In the absence of the representative agent or a complete contingent claims markets
assumption, we would encounter di±culties in determining the ¯rms' criterion function.
See for example Radner (1974).
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2.5 Symmetric equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of functions (Ct; Mt; Vt; St; wt; rt;
pt; Kt+1; Lt+1) de¯ned on the aggregate state -t, which satisfy (i) pro¯t
and value maximization of ¯rms, (ii) utility maximization of agents, and
(iii) market clearing. The symmetry of the environment and market clearing







what follows we will study the attributes of a symmetric equilibrium.
3 Dynamic behavior
3.1 Rational expectations solution
As is the case for most RBC models, the present model cannot be solved
analytically. Following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), we loglinearize the
model around its balanced growth path in the absence of shocks. Let us
denote percentage deviations from the steady state by cXt;; the rational ex-




























Et bSt+1 ¡ bSt+1
Etb¹t+1 ¡ b¹t+1
Et b̧t+1 ¡ b̧t+1
0
0





where we note that search time, bS; the shadow value of wealth, b̧; and the
shadow value of employment; b¹; are endogenous and nonpredetermined. The
presence of imperfect competition and matching externalities implies that it
is not possible to solve for the market equilibrium as the solution to the social
planner's problem. More importantly, the usual Arrow-Debreu welfare theo-
rems cannot be invoked to rule out irregular rational expectations equilibria.
In particular, if the matrixM has more than three eigenvalues inside the unit
circle, the rational expectations path is no longer unique. Such dynamic sys-
tems are said to be irregular. Indeterminacy in rational expectations of this
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type implies that equilibria are possible in which °uctuations in economic
activity can be driven by arbitrary and self-ful¯lling changes in people's ex-
pectations. It should be stressed that such sunspot equilibria are not based
on agent irrationality - under the circumstances it is perfectly rational to
follow such nonfundamental signals. Rational expectations business cycle
models with indeterminacy represent a workable equilibrium interpretation
of Keynes' animal spirits hypothesis.10
3.2 Calibration
In this subsection we describe the parametric speci¯cation of our model and
assign parameter values such that the long run properties of our model econ-
omy correspond to the growth path of postwar Germany. This calibration
methodology is now common procedure in modern dynamic general equilib-
rium theory. The fundamental period in the model is the quarter, so we will
compare our model economy performance to quarterly German time series.
In the absence of stochastic disturbances, the model is in its steady state.
In steady state, we assume that the agents spend 20 percent of their time
endowment working and searching. We set the rate of unemployment equal to
7.5 percent which implies a value for S of 0.016; this implies that unemployed
agents spend about 20 minutes per day (on average) in search. The parameter
±L, which is also the ratio of unemployment rate to the employment rate, is
set to 0.081. We assume % = 0:78 as in Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
Labor and ¯rms are assigned equal bargaining strength so that » = 0:50:We
set the steady state tax rate ¿ such that the unemployed agents receive 50
percent of the steady state net wage, which is realistic for Germany. The
parameters (®; ¯; and ±K) are standard in RBC models (see for example
Cooley and Prescott, 1995).
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark model. Remaining parameters will be
calibrated in the next section. Depending on the particular values taken by
those parameters, the implied consumption share is roughly 75 percent and
the fraction aV=Y assumes very small positive values (less than one percent
of output).
10See Farmer (1993) for extensive discussions of these issues.
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We have ¯xed all parameters a priori except the degree of increasing returns
(µ), the replacement rate (rr ´ b=(1¡¿ )w), the welfare generosity parameter
(") and the labor supply elasticity (¡Â¡1). Our strategy is now to look at
the behavior of the economy for various combinations of these parameters.
In particular, we are interested in those combinations which contribute to
yield irregular equilibria.
For this purpose we look at the eigenvalues which result from our preferred
calibrations. We ¯rst consider combinations of µ and the slope of the labor
supply which yield indeterminacy of rational expectations paths. To focus
attention on a benchmark case with the least institutional detail, we set both
rr and " { and thereby taxes { equal to zero.11 Figure 1 shows that at one
extreme, the minimum increasing returns required to obtain indeterminacy is
1.51 in Hansen's (1985) case of in¯nitely elastic aggregate labor supply, and
is slightly higher than in the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model which uses a
standard labor market. At the other extreme, the lower bound on increasing
returns necessary for indeterminacy rises at low labor supply elasticities.
Again, this pattern is similar to models with a Walrasian labor market. We
conclude that in this parametrization, dynamic equilibria with indeterminacy
can only obtain at implausibly high returns to scale.
11To facilitate comparison with Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1995), we consider in this
case a Cobb-Douglas matching function with an elasticity of matches with respect to
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Figure 1: Indeterminacy regions in (chi, theta) space.
In Figure 2 we take a di®erent tack, assessing combinations of rr and "
while assuming constant returns to scale and Â = 0. Evidently, once tax
distortions are introduced, indeterminacy is more likely to obtain. In fact,
if the net replacement ratio exceeds roughly 50 percent (which is the case
for unemployment compensation in Germany and most Western European
countries) increasing returns in production are no longer necessary to in-
duce the indeterminacy result. If we allow for welfare payments (" > 0),
the model exhibits indeterminacy at all reasonable calibrations for European
economies. A numerical example that implies indeterminacy at constant re-
turns underscores the plausibility of our argument: assuming German values
for the gross quarterly wage income of 7500 Euro, a replacement rate of 58
percent, and " equal to 0.30, the calibration implies that the social security
payments are 954 Euro per quarter, a plausible value for Germany's current
welfare system.
We o®er the following economic intuition for indeterminacy: suppose that
agents expect the future real return to labor (and capital) to be high: they
start investing and searching today to realize these returns tomorrow. Under
normal conditions of decreasing returns, a higher level of employment implies
a lower future wage rate and thus cannot be a rationally expected equilibrium
since the wage must increase rather than decrease. That is exactly where
increasing returns enter the picture. Future output and marginal products
must rise in order to validate expectations of a higher marginal product.


























Figure 2: Indeterminacy region in (epsilon, r) space.
and the initial optimistic belief of higher returns is self-ful¯lling. This can
only happen if increasing returns in production allow it, or if taxes on labor
income are countercyclical. But this is exactly what the balanced budget
requires. Since increased employment implies a lower equilibrium tax rate,
the after-tax return to labor can be increasing with labor even in the absence
of increasing returns to scale. Expectations on higher returns can again be
self-ful¯lling. Furthermore, the procyclical reduction in distortions shifts out
the e®ective production possibility frontier, generating a wealth e®ect that
spurs additional spending. A complementary e®ect arises from the additional
¯scal relief due to lower take-up of welfare in good times.
We suspect that the model's (¯scal and productive) increasing returns are
only partly responsible for the result and that the model's pseudo two-sector
structure { induced by the delay between increased search of ¯rms and work-
ers and increased employment { is also responsible.12 That is, an increase
in search activity need not coincide with employment reductions. Rather,
additional resources can be drawn out of leisure. The equilibrium return
schedules to labor and to search shift as a result of the agents composition
of time allocation. This behavior will also be important in explaining the
model's output persistence.
12One might think of two separate technologies with output which is either physical




In Table 1 and 2 we present business cycle statistics in the form of population
moments for macroeconomic variables from the U.S. and West Germany. We
choose Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltering as our lens for viewing the data. Like many
O.E.C.D. countries, one ¯nds a con¯rmation of the usual business cycle facts:
consumption is (slightly) smoother than GDP whereas investment is much
more volatile than GDP. Business cycle persistence refers to the fact that
when the growth rate of undetrended output is above average, it tends to
remain high for a few quarters. One measure of persistence is the autocorre-
lation statistic; if the data follow a random walk, the autocorrelation is zero;
if there is strong mean reversion in the levels, the ¯rst di®erenced data would
evidence negative autocorrelation. For U.S. and German GDP data, the au-
tocorrelation statistic displays positive serial correlation positive for lags one
to three. The U.S. economy display similar statistics. The only important
di®erences between the two economies appear to be that the U.S. cycle is less
persistent than Germany's, and that labor lags the cycle in Germany rather
than being coincident.
Table 2: U.S.A. 1954:I-1991:II
Correlation of Output (real GDP) with
Variable x Rel. Volatility x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.00 0.38 0.63 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.63 0.38
Consumption 0.50 0.55 0.68 0.78 0.77 0.64 0.47 0.27
Investment 3.10 0.43 0.63 0.82 0.90 0.81 0.60 0.35
Labor 0.97 0.14 0.39 0.67 0.88 0.91 0.80 0.63
Wage share 0.45 -0.44 -0.53 -0.51 -0.46 -0.13 0.13 0.32
Unemployment 7.08 -0.51 -0.68 -0.83 -0.83 -0.76. -0.59 -0.42
Vacancies 8.08 0.55 0.74 0.87 0.93 0.85 0.68 0.47
Output growth 1.00 0.03 0.22 0.37 1.00 0.37 0.22 0.03
Source: Cooley (1995) and Christiano and Todd (1996) from which we took the output growth ¯gures (1947:I-1995:I).
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Table 3: Germany 1970:I-1994:IV
Correlation of Output (real GDP) with
Variable x Rel. Volatility x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.00 0.60 0.78 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.78 0.60
Consumption 0.66 0.62 0.75 0.85 0.94 0.92 0.73 0.60
Investment 1.98 0.55 0.74 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.79 0.65
Labor 0.51 0.09 0.28 0.48 0.65 0.78 0.84 0.85
Wage share 0.57 -0.54 -0.53 -0.46 -0.36 -0.18 0.02 0.21
Unemployment 9.49 -0.30 -0.48 -0.69 -0.78 -0.85 -0.86 -0.80
Vacancies 10.51 0.45 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.39
Output growth 1.00 0.28 0.21 0.35 1.00 0.35 0.21 0.28
Variable de¯nitions: Private Final Consumption Expenditures (C), I=Fixed Capital Formation (I), Output =C+I
Total Employment, Standardized Unemployment Rate. All variables (except wage share and unemployment) were logged
and detrended by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. National income and product accounts data are measured in 1991
DM terms. Source of Data: OECD National Accounts and IMF Economic Indicators, Statistisches Bundesamt (output
growth).
4.2 Model Moments
4.2.1 Search Model with Determinate Solution Paths (RBC)
We begin by exploring the implications of an economy not subject to any
imperfections except for labor market search. In particular, we consider
an economy with output elasticity of capital (®) equal to 0.36, " = rr = 0;
constant returns (µ = 1); equal bargaining power, » = 0:5; and Â = ¡1): This
economy is determinate. It is well-known that when productivity shocks are
serially uncorrelated, the model is largely incapable of replicating business
cycle behavior, and so we abstain from belaboring this point. When subject
to persistent technology shocks (½z = 0:95), the model generates the following
business cycles:
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Table 4: RBC with Search (" = rr = 0; µ = 1; » = 0:5; Â = ¡1)
Correlation of Output with
Variable x Rel. Volatility x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.00 0.30 0.53 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.53 0.30
Consumption 0.34 0.10 0.36 0.67 0.91 0.79 0.66 0.55
Investment 3.57 0.36 0.57 0.82 0.99 0.78 0.47 0.21
Labor 0.37 0.20 0.45 0.63 0.84 0.91 0.53 0.24
Wage Share 0.11 -0.22 -0.28 -0.32 -0.16 0.41 0.33 0.28
Unemployment 0.39 -0.06 -0.10 -0.17 -0.36 -0.77 -0.48 -0.26
Vacancies 4.55 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.18 -0.36 -0.31 -0.27
Output growth 1.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.26 1.00 0.26 -0.07 -0.06
Statistics are based on 2000 arti¯cial realizations of the model.
As already established by Andolfatto (1996), the RBC model with search
is able to replicate major stylized business cycle facts, in both qualitative
terms and as regards relative volatilities and comovements of output with
other macroeconomic aggregates. Moreover, the persistence of output and
output growth is signi¯cantly greater than in standard RBC models with
Walrasian labor markets.13 Ostensibly, sluggishness resulting from labor
market matching generates positive autocorrelations (at lag one). Another
unusual feature is that labor lags the cycle by one quarter as in the U.S.
economy. Unlike standard RBC models, the wage share is nonconstant and
follows a countercyclical pattern as reported in Tables 2 and 3. In addition,
it is noteworthy that our model generates a slight phase shift in the wage
share which is also found in the data, a fact which is not replicated by Merz's
(1995) RBC model.
4.2.2 Search Model with Indeterminacy deriving from Institu-
tions
We now turn to model economies with indeterminacy induced by institutional
features, modest increasing returns, or both. We assume constant returns in
production and some imperfections due to the government intervention. We
¯rst consider a model in which indeterminacy arises due to institutions only.
To focus discussion on the innovations in this paper, we consider " = 0:3;
13Cogley and Nason (1995) show the absence of persistence for a wide variety of RBC
settings.
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» = 0:4; and rr = 0:5 with otherwise standard features: Â = 0 (Hansen,
1985), constant returns, and ® = 0:3: The model is driven by white noise
sunspot activity only. The resulting economy is described compactly in Table
5.
Table 5 Sunspots (" = 0:3; » = 0:4; rr = 0:5, Â = 0, µ = 1)
Correlation of Output with
Variable x Rel. Volatility x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.00 0.11 0.41 0.78 1.00 0.78 0.41 0.11
Consumption 0.16 -0.24 0.05 0.37 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.62
Investment 3.89 0.06 0.31 0.67 0.98 0.79 0.41 0.09
Labor 1.58 0.15 0.45 0.80 0.99 0.74 0.36 0.04
Wage Share 0.15 0.37 0.45 0.28 -0.25 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05
Unemployment 1.64 0.03 -0.19 -0.56 -0.95 -0.82 -0.46 -0.14
Vacancies 12.73 0.59 0.40 -0.26 -0.50 -0.44 -0.30 -0.16
Output growth 1.00 -0.22 -0.08 0.34 1.00 0.34 -0.08 -0.22
The ¯rst remarkable qualitative result is that consumption is procyclical
without any need of scale economies or technology shocks. This can be re-
garded as an improvement of indeterminacy models with low (here constant)
returns to scale. The economic intuition for this result is as follows. First, in
the presence of ¯scal increasing returns, distortions are countercyclical and
thereby shift the e®ective (net-of-tax) production possibility frontier. Sec-
ondly, the resources that the economy allocates towards vacancies - less than
one percent of output - are countercyclical. In a sense, the economy has
a two-sector character with ¯rms' search as the absorbing sector. Further,
output is persistent as evinced by the signi¯cant positive autocorrelation of
output growth. The wage share and the rate of unemployment are counter-
cyclical. In contrast to most models of this genre, labor input is more volatile
than in the data.
Two problems with the sunspot variant of our model should be noted.
First, the wage share displays the wrong phase shift: it peaks a few quarters
before output rather than lagging it. Second and more signi¯cantly, while
vacancies lead the cycle, their contemporaneous negative correlation with
output is at odds with what is observed in actual economies. An intuition
for this result is the increasing unattractiveness of posting vacancies as the
economy approaches the peak in the cycle. Recall that the attractiveness of
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vacancies can be derived from their e®ectiveness in generating employment
matches. As unemployment in the form of search and leisure declines, the
return from vacancies declines as well. Consequently, only improving returns
from employment can rationalize posting more vacancies. Clearly, this points
to a feature missing from our model, either the need for shifts in the pro-
duction function (due either to technology shocks or to increasing returns)
or to heterogeneity in labor markets which could explain on-the-job search
and job ladder phenomena. The latter would be an interesting aspect as it
is well-known that mobility and vacancies are strongly procyclical, while the
reporting of vacancies is countercyclical. Yet it is not clear that this feature
hinders our ability to account for the lion's share of labor market facts.
4.2.3 Search Model with Indeterminacy Deriving from Increasing
Returns in Production
The third case we consider assumes increasing returns to scale. We set µ = 1:2
which is at the upper bound of recent studies for the U.S. economy and
appears even more plausible for Europe.14 Table 6 reports the statistics
associated with the increasing returns model. As with the previous example,
we continue to suppress technological shocks and assume white noise sunspot
shocks only.
Table 6 Increasing returns and sunspots (ibid and µ = 1:2)
Correlation of Output with
Variable x Rel. Volatility x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.00 0.41 0.62 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.62 0.41
Consumption 0.33 0.41 0.68 0.88 0.79 0.71 0.61 0.51
Investment 4.01 0.03 0.46 0.68 0.96 0.83 0.59 0.36
Labor 1.19 0.46 0.67 0.87 0.99 0.81 0.55 0.32
Wage Share 0.15 0.28 0.30 0.16 -0.33 -0.21 -0.19 -0.15
Unemployment 1.19 -0.30 -0.46 -0.68 -0.96 -0.84 -0.61 -0.38
Vacancies 8.09 0.43 0.48 0.35 -0.19 -0.36 -0.35 -0.30
Output growth 1.00 0.02 0.08 0.35 1.00 0.35 0.08 0.02
This variant can replicate a business cycle characteristics slightly better
than the ¯rst: consumption becomes more volatile and more procyclical.
14See for example Basu and Fernald (1997), and RÄoger (1999).
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Similarly to the U.S. data, it slightly leads the cycle. When compared to the
model version with constant returns in production, vacancies lead the cycle
and are only mildly negatively correlated at lag zero.
4.3 Impulse response dynamics
Next, we will illustrate the endogenous propagation mechanism in the model
by turning to the impulse response dynamics. We focus on the response of
the economy to innovations to technology and to sunspots shocks, and we
limit this exercise to the case of constant returns in production. Figure 3
traces the responses associated with a one-time technology shock. Output,
consumption, investment and labor all rise on impact. The variables ex-
hibit the typical hump-shape responses and they return to their steady state
only very slowly. In Figure 4 we track the response of the same economy
to a white-noise sunspot shock. Output does not response on impact; it is
predetermined since total factor productivity is constant. As modelled, the
sunspot shock therefore reduces some output component { in our case invest-
ment. This corresponds to the discussed countercyclical behavior that arises
for the constant returns version of the model. Yet, starting in the second pe-
riod, the variables show a positive comovement. Again, the striking feature
of the model is the degree of persistence imparted by a transitory shock: all
the persistence is due to endogenous propagation for the white noise shock15
Output needs more than seven years to return to its steady state.16 Overall,
the model is able to signi¯cantly propagate temporary shocks which con-
tributes in explaining stylized facts which we have identi¯ed.
5 Complementarities in Policy Interventions:
Partial versus Global Reforms
In widely noted papers, Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower
(1998) discuss the ine±cacy of partial labor market reforms which marginally
15Contrast this to the productivity shock in the standard RBC model, which in standard
calibrations carries an autocorrelation coe±cient of ½ > 0:




























Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a unit shock to the sunspot.
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alter only a subspace of existing labor market interventions without address-
ing interactions the institutions might have on incentives. This complemen-
tarity of policy reform means, for example, that a piecemeal reduction of
unemployment bene¯t will deliver only modest labor market e®ects, if taxa-
tion, union bargaining, or the social welfare system are not reformed at the
same time. Here we argue that in a well-articulated dynamic general equi-
librium model, this conclusion extends to the persistence of output as well.17
This is because the elimination of sunspot equilibria which arise in economies
such as these may require simultaneous reforms, i.e. that several parameters
be changed at the same time.
To see this, return to Figure 2, which depicts combinations of the steady-
state replacement rate rr and welfare generosity " that yield either deter-
minacy or indeterminacy while holding the rest of the model parameters
at standard settings. The previous section associated high output persis-
tence with the indeterminacy regime, and moreover that indeterminacy in
our setup can also arise from "bad policy" con¯gurations, not just increasing
aggregate returns in production as in the standard literature (e.g. Farmer and
Guo 1994). Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that in the absence of government
policies, the model economy we consider is determinate, unless increasing
returns in production are implausibly large. By continuity, there will exist
a set of liberalizations of labor market policies which can eliminate sunspot
equilibria and thereby reduce economic instability. If reforms are only par-
tial, however, this may not be the case. For example, if the replacement
ratio exceeds a threshold of 50 percent (which is below the relevant rate in
Germany and most other Western European countries), the complete elimina-
tion of social welfare payments does not alter the qualitative behavior of the
economy; the model remains indeterminate and subject to nonfundamental
shocks. Equivalently, if the misclassi¯cation rate or generosity parameter " is
large, a stronger cutback in replacement rates is needed to rule out sunspot
equilibria. Overall, our results support the notion that global reforms of the
social welfare system are more appropriate than small, piecemeal changes for
17It is possible to show that by moving out of the indeterminacy region and towards the
perfect market economy is welfare-improving. A similar conclusion applies when sunspot
°uctuations are suppressed while remaining in the indeterminacy region, with constant
returns in production. In this case, gains from intertemporal bunching of economic activity
are small in relation to the agents' incentive to smooth consumption. A complete welfare
analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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reducing volatility in the macroeconomy.
Whatever incentives may be in a laissez-faire economy to substitute in-
tertemporally, they are °attened out by the social system. This increases
persistence in general. Then the self-ful¯lling story kicks in: if agents believe
times are bad, spending time searching becomes less lucrative. Thus the
taxes are high and there is no reason to invest, remuneration remains low,
so there is no reason to search. The key aspect is that the social system
aggravates the situation, because one needs to search today to get the job
tomorrow.
6 Conclusion
Most equilibrium business cycles models, while long on microfoundations, are
hard-pressed to replicate key business cycle facts. In this paper we show that
progress is possible on this front by considering explicit imperfections in the
labor market as well as their complementarity. Although the labor market is
the economy's "boiler room", accounting for two-thirds of all factor payment
transactions, the quality and demand for what is traded is in fact remarkably
heterogeneous and trade highly decentralized. Actions of agents may exert
external e®ects on the evolution of the aggregate quantity of labor transacted.
Finally, the wage is an instrument of distribution of surplus as well as an
indicator of labor productivity. The size of the surplus as well as its division
may be in°uenced by non-market factors, primarily labor market institutions.
As a result, factor remuneration may deviate signi¯cantly from neoclassical
marginal cost principles, at least in the short to medium term. Surprisingly,
such imperfections and their interaction only occupy a subsidiary role in
the literature on dynamic equilibrium macromodels. The introduction of
labor market imperfections, wage bargaining, and endogenous search combine
and interact with a distortionary government to create persistence in the
simulated time series.
A central ¯nding of this paper is that, for a plausible region of the pa-
rameter space, labor market institutions can induce both strong persistence
as well as nonuniqueness of rational expectations equilibria. Furthermore, it
is no longer necessary to impose increasing returns in production to induce
this result. In recent years, a number of researchers have formulated mod-
els with sunspot equilibria and self-ful¯lling prophecies as an alternative to
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the technology-driven, real business cycle literature. This paper contributes
to this literature by bringing together both sunspot and technology-driven
business cycle models with a non-Walrasian labor market. In particular, it is
to our knowledge the ¯rst attempt within the general equilibrium indetermi-
nacy literature that departs from the assumption of perfect labor markets. It
is shown that with these simple changes, the model can reproduce a number
of key stylized facts of the business cycle. Some of these elusive stylized facts
include the persistence and countercyclical behavior of the labor share and
unemployment, as well as cyclical patterns of output and its components.
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